According to the European Commission’s report, Serbia spent €7.3 billion on public procurement last year, with €7.1 billion allocated through various exceptions to the Public Procurement Law. Vladimir Medjak from the European Movement in Serbia highlighted that a significant portion of this spending, 38%, was linked to bilateral agreements with China and Russia. He pointed out that 51% of total public procurement went to tenders with only one bidder.
In a conversation with Zoran Sekulić, Medjak explained that public procurement with a single bidder accounted for 5% of Serbia’s gross national product, while the average number of bidders fell from 2.5 to 2.4 over the past year, which he termed catastrophic.
A notable development in the report was the European Commission’s first assessment of the functioning of democratic institutions in Serbia, categorizing them as “mixed,” which is worse than all other countries in the region.
Serbia scored 3.11 on the European integration progress scale in this latest report, up from 3.05 previously, indicating minimal progress of 0.06 since last year. Since 2015, the overall progress has been just 0.23, suggesting a stagnation on the path to EU membership.
Medjak expressed concerns that Serbia might miss the current opportunity for EU enlargement, which is gaining importance due to geopolitical factors. He emphasized that this could be the last chance for enlargement, warning that member states will not admit countries that resist integration.
He also critiqued the Serbian government’s stance on sanctions against Russia, interpreting Prime Minister statements as indicating a willingness to impose sanctions only when certain of EU membership. Medjak argued that this suggests a transactional approach to foreign relations, where the government seeks to gain benefits while avoiding necessary reforms.
Regarding Serbia’s simultaneous arms exports to Ukraine, he noted that this is part of a pattern of compensating for shortcomings, highlighting the inconsistency in government messaging and actions.
Medjak suggested that while Serbia might open new negotiation clusters with the EU, it does not equate to genuine readiness for membership, especially without meeting the transitional criteria of chapters 23 and 24 related to political standards.
He expressed skepticism about the government’s commitment to serious reforms and highlighted that substantial changes would require addressing high corruption and establishing the rule of law. Medjak cited Montenegro as an example of effective reform, where legal changes and arrests have been made.
Despite identifying some positive elements in Serbia’s Reform Agenda, he criticized the timeline for implementation and the lack of measures against Russia.
Medjak believes Kosovo is no longer a significant issue for negotiations, asserting that the Serbian government has fulfilled its obligations in that regard. He argued that effective negotiation would necessitate making the process difficult for the government rather than for the Serbian people.
Looking ahead, he anticipates that new European officials will prioritize democracy and the rule of law, with member states likely to resist allowing geopolitical interests to overshadow these issues.
Medjak concluded by stating that Serbia has become trapped in a vicious cycle, with the possibility of escape hinging on either a change in government or the current administration taking decisive actions. He suggested that external pressure from the EU and the US could prompt necessary changes, especially given the need for stability in the Western Balkans.
