Serbia’s foreign trade with Russia has seen a notable decline since the beginning of this year, shedding light on the country’s failure to fully leverage the Russia-Serbia Free Trade Agreement signed in August 2000. Economic analysts observe a discernible shift away from Russia, evident in this decline, yet lament Serbia’s missed opportunities with such trade pacts across multiple nations.
Saša Đogović, an economist at New Economy, remarks, “Apples, once a significant export to Russia, now find markets elsewhere, debunking concerns about sanctions. With an impending free trade pact with Egypt, new close markets emerge—there’s always an alternative.”
Examining import-export figures reveals consistency with few deviations: in 2020, imports from Russia totaled $1.6 billion, ranking fourth, rising to $1.8 billion the next year, peaking at $3.1 billion in 2022, and declining to $1.7 billion in 2023, dropping Russia to fifth place.
The surge in imports during Ukraine’s war and domestic energy crisis likely stemmed from a favorable gas contract as prices surged; subsequent years saw price reductions.
Exports to Russia were valued at $911 million in 2020 (sixth place), dropped to $996 million (seventh) in 2021, and peaked at $1.2 billion (eighth) in 2022 and 2023, indicating stable long-term trade volumes despite fluctuations, notably in military equipment procurement.
Ivan Nikolić, an economist at Macroeconomic Analysis and Trends (MAT), notes the stagnant impact of the Free Trade Agreement: “There’s been no major exchange; energy price shifts inflate prices but not volumes.”
Despite potential benefits, such agreements remain underutilized. Nikolić suggests that while the Russia deal could attract foreign investment, Serbia has not capitalized fully, with most top exporters to Russia being EU firms.
In 2021, exports reached €438.9 million, slightly up from five years prior, reflecting a prolonged export stagnation despite preferential trade terms.
“Narrow results persist in Russian exports to Serbia,” Nikolić adds, citing dominance in energy-mineral products and military goods, questioning Russia’s competitive diversity beyond oil, gas, and weapons.
As Serbia diversifies, concerns mount over potential Chinese influx post-agreement. Amidst evolving trade dynamics, Serbia’s dependency on Russian goods, especially in energy, is shifting with new market and infrastructural developments.
